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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Brandon I\J. Crump timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction.
On appeal, Mr. Crump argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Crump was charged, by Information, with trafficking in methamphetamine or
amphetamine by manufacturing, and felony injury to child.

(R., pp.83-84.)

Plea

agreement negotiations ensued and the State offered to reduce Mr. Crump's charge to
trafficking by attempted manufacturing. (R., p.103.) Mr. Crump filled out a guilty plea
advisory from which stated that he could receive two to fifteen years for attempted
trafficking. (R., p.101.) Mr. Crump also signed a pretrial settlement offer which stated
that he could receive a sentence of "2 fixed - 15 years .... " (R., pp.103-104.) The
written offer also stated that the State would limit its recommendation to "2 FIXED + 2
INDETERMINATE," and Mr. Crump was free to make separate recommendations.
(R., pp.103-104.)
At the change of plea hearing, the district court told Mr. Crump that he was
pleading guilty to a charge that carried a minimum sentence of two years fixed and a
maximum of fifteen years. (09/19/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-20.) Later in that hearing, the district
court told Mr. Crump that the State is "going to recommend a four year max, two fixed
and two indeterminate.

That is a total of four years."

(09/19/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.21-23.)

The district court then asked the State if there was a deal "on a retained jurisdiction
recommendation here?" (09/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.17-18.) The State responded "No, Your
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Honor. It's a fixed two." (09/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.19-20.) Ultimately, Mr. Crump pleaded
guilty to attempted trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine by manufacturing
and, in return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charge. (R., pp.88-89, 101,
103, 106.)
Mr. Crump then obtained private counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, a supporting memorandum, and supporting affidavits. (R., pp.125-126, 130-131,
133-144.) One of the factual assertions made in support of the motion was that, at the
change of plea hearing, Mr. Crump did not understand that trafficking by attempted
manufacturing carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years fixed. (R., pp.150,
152.)
At the hearing on the withdrawal motion, trial counsel argued that the pretrial
settlement offer only states that attempted trafficking carries a fixed two-year sentence,
but it did not state that it carries mandatory two-year minimum sentence.

(03/08/12

Tr., p.5, L3 - p.6, L.21.) At the change of plea hearing, trial counsel also argued that
Mr. Crump was never told that trafficking carried a mandatory minimum two-year
sentence. (03/08/12 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.8, L.11.) It was also noted that the district court
which accepted Mr. Grump's plea 1 did not recognize that trafficking carried a mandatory
two-year sentence because the court asked if there was an agreement on a retained
jurisdiction recommendation. (03/08/12 Tr., p.17, L.4-p.19, L.9.) Instead of providing
clarity, the prosecutor stated that it's a fixed two, which added to the confusion.
(03/08/12 Tr., p.12, Ls. 3-11.)

Trial counsel went on to argue that at no time in the

1

The Honorable George Reinhardt presided over the change of plea hearing and the
Honorable Steven C. Verby presided over the plea withdrawal hearing. (09/19/11 Tr.,
p.2, Ls.12-15; 03/08/12 Tr., p.1.)
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change of plea hearing did someone tell Mr. Crump that he was pleading guilty to a
crime which has a two year mandatory minimum. (03/08/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-14.)
Mr. Crump testified at the plea withdrawal hearing, and said that he thought that
the district court had the ability to order a period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter,
rider), if he pleaded guilty to attempted trafficking.

(03/08/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.12 - p.18.)

Mr. Crump testified that it was on November 21st that he learned from another attorney
that the district court could not order a rider in his case because attempted trafficking
carries a mandatory two year sentence.

(03/08/12 Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.22, L.10.)

On

cross-examination, Mr. Crump testified that he knew trafficking carried a two-year fixed
sentence, but when he signed the plea agreement he believed he could get a rider
because it did not say the sentence was a mandatory two-year fixed sentence.
(03/08/12 Tr., p.24, L.17 - p.25, L.10.)

However, he also testified that his former

attorney told him he was not eligible for a rider. (03/08/12 Tr., p.35, Ls.10-23.)
The district court made a factual finding that the written plea agreement "does
appear to be ambiguous, at least in certain respects." (03/08/12 Tr., p.55, Ls.5-8.) The
district court then stated that the ambiguity could be clarified by "what I'm going to
characterize as parts of the oral agreement." (03/08/12 Tr., p.55, Ls.9-12.) The district
court then made the following factual findings:
Now, Mr. Crump testified that he knew that he was ineligible for a
retained jurisdiction. He testified that he knew he was facing a fixed term
in prison of two years by agreeing to the amended plea agreement. So
instead of facing five years in prison as a minimum, he was facing two
years in prison as a minimum.
I could go ahead and simply state at this point that he did know
what he was getting into when he entered the plea of guilty.
(03/08/12 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-22.) The district court also determined that the State would
be prejudiced if Mr. Crump withdrew his guilty plea because his wife, Mr. Crump's co3

defendant, received a better plea agreement based on Mr. Grump's guilty plea and
because the State dismissed charges in Mr. Grump's case with prejudice in order to
induce Mr. Grump's guilty plea. (03/08/11 Tr., p.55, L.22 - p.56, L.22.) The district court
denied Mr. Grump's motion to withdraw guilty plea, then imposed and executed a
unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.163, 168-171.) Mr. Crump
timely appeals. (R., pp.164-165.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Crump's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea filed prior to sentencing?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Grump's Motion To
\/Vithdraw His Guilty Plea Filed Prior To Sentencing

A.

Introduction
Mr. Crump argues that his guilty plea was unconstitutional as he did not

understand that attempted trafficking in methamphetamine carried a mandatory twoyear minimum sentence. The only issue which needs to be determined on appeal is
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the district court's
factual finding that Mr. Crump understood that he was facing a mandatory minimum
sentence of two years by pleading guilty to attempted trafficking in methamphetamine.
Mindful of the applicable standard of review, Mr. Crump argues that the district court's
factual finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Grump's Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea Filed Prior To Sentencing
"[TJhe granting or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the

discretion of the trial court." State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). "A
threshold question is whether the plea of guilty was knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily made."

Id. at 959.

The question of whether a plea complies with these

standards turns on whether:
(1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse
witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant
understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct. App. 2002). "[l]f the plea is legally defective,

relief must be granted." Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959. In determining whether the plea
6

was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, an Idaho appellate court reviews all of the
surrounding circumstances disclosed in the record. Huck v. State, 1
(Ct. App. 1993).

Idaho 1

161

"A district court's finding that a plea is voluntary, knowing and

intelligent is a question of fact which we will not disturb if it is supported by substantial
evidence." Id.
Mr. Crump argues that his guilty plea was constitutionally deficient because he
did not understand the consequences of his plea. Specifically, he argues that he did not
understand that by pleading guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine
by attempted manufacturing as set forth in I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(3), he was subject to a
mandatory two-year minimum sentence. In order to establish that he didn't understand
the consequences of his plea, Mr. Crump must establish that he did not understand a
direct, as opposed to a collateral, consequence of his plea. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887.
"A consequence is direct if it presents 'a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect
on the defendant's range of punishment."' Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458,
460 (Ct. App. 2000)). In Huffman, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery.
Id. at 886. He argued that his guilty plea was not legal because he did not know that his

sentences for each count of forgery could be ordered to run consecutively to each other.
While the defendant ultimately lost his appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that a
"defendant must be made aware ... of direct consequences of the plea, including
maximum punishments." Id. at 887. The court went on to hold that a defendant must
be made aware of the possibility that two sentences could be ordered to run
consecutively.

Id. at 888.

consequence of a guilty plea.

As such, a mandatory minimum sentence is a direct
Therefore, the limited issue on appeal is whether the

district court's factual finding that Mr. Crump understood that his guilty plea would
7

expose him to a mandatory minimum two-year sentence is supported by substantial and
competent evidence. 2
Mindful of the applicable standard of review and the fact that Mr. Grump's factual
findings were supported by Mr. Grump's testimony, Mr. Crump argues that in this case,
the district court's factual finding that Mr. Crump understood the consequences of the
plea agreement is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Specifically,
Mr. Crump argues that the guilty plea advisory form and the written plea agreement
mention that attempted trafficking in marijuana carries a sentence of two years fixed, but
they do not state that it carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years.
(R., pp.101, 103-104.) This distinction is relevant because the Idaho Court of Appeals,
while interpreting a different subsection of the same statute under which Mr. Crump was
convicted, concluded that the use of the language "mandatory minimum" precludes a
district court from either retaining jurisdiction or commuting the sentence to county jail
time as that language requires the court to impose and execute the mandatory portion
of the sentence.

State v. Brooks, 131 Idaho 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1998).

Since

Mr. Crump was only informed that I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(3) carried a fixed sentence of two
years, not that a mandatory minimum sentence of two years, he contends that the
district court's factual finding that he understood the consequences of his guilty was in
error.

2

Since the district court also found that the State would be prejudiced because of the
plea agreement with Mr. Grump's wife, and because it dismissed charges against
Mr. Crump with prejudice (03/08/12 Tr., p.55, L.22 - p.56, L.22), Mr. Crump is not
arguing that there was just reason for the district court to withdraw his guilty plea.
Additionally, the crux of his argument hinged on the assertion that he did not understand
the consequences of his guilty plea.
8

Additionally, the language used by the attorneys at the change of plea hearing
created so much confusion that the district court, which accepted Mr. Crump's guilty
plea, thought it had the authority to order a rider after he pleaded guilty.

(09/19/11

Tr., 10, Ls. 7-20, p.13, Ls.4-25, p.14, Ls.20.) If the district court didn't think there was a
mandatory minimum sentence for attempted trafficking, it is reasonable to believe that
Mr. Crump did not understand that he was facing a mandatory minimum sentence.
In sum, Mr. Crump contends that the district court's factual finding that he
understood the consequences of his guilty plea was not supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Since this undermines the constitutionality of IVlr. Crump's guilty
plea. the plea is void, and the prejudice to the State is irrelevant.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Crump respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of
conviction, reverse the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
and remand this matter for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013.
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SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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